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Abstract: This article highlights the effects particular features of microfinance
programs have on childhood education. Using data from a South India household
survey, the article examines how microfinance impacts schooling and literacy,
how credit enters the household, and who brings it in. Regression results show
that, in the case of direct bank-borrower credit delivery, it does not matter
whether credit enters the household through the mother or the father. However,
large differences occur when mothers obtain credit through women's groups.
Analysis indicates that combined financial and social-group intermediation leads
to higher educational inputs and outputs, mainly for girls. Individual interviewis
with borrowers and interviews with women's groups suggest that changes in
underlying allocative rules that are provoked by group membership could be
explanatory for the results obtained.

N

owadays, a broad-based consensus has emerged that children’s education, and in particular the education of girls,
is one of the crucial ingredients for a country’s economic
growth and its sustained human and economic development. That
the international consensus should also be considered as a
guideline for policy making may be read from the fact that two of
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the UN Millennium Development Goals are directly linked to
children’s education. They stipulate that by the year 2015, “all boys
and girls should complete a full course of primary schooling” and
that “the gender disparity in primary and secondary education
should preferably be eliminated by 2005, and at all levels by 2015”
(IMF, OECD, UN, & World Bank, 2000). In this context, one of
the pressing issues for policy makers in the international and
national arena is to find effective ways to reach the goals set.
It is against this background that we explore the possible role
microfinance could play. In the last decade microfinance has been
extolled as a panacea for poverty alleviation and increasing human
well-being. Over the years, studies have compiled evidence regarding the effect of microfinance schemes on a variety of factors,
including household expenditures, household assets, women’s
contraceptive use, women’s empowerment, and children’s human
capital investment in health and education. Success stories such as
those of the Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh, the BancoSol in
Bolivia, and Bank Raykat Indonesia’s Unit Desa in Indonesia (BRI)
have been widely reported on (see, for instance, Chaves &
Gonzalez-Vega, 1996; Hashemi & Schuler, 1994; Hulme &
Mosley, 1996; Khandker, 1998), and some of the achievements
have also been put into perspective (see e.g., Goetz & Sen Gupta,
1996; Mosley, 2001; Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-Vega, &
Rodriguez-Meza, 2000; Rahman, 1998).
Putting all the evidence together, it is clear that there is no
clear-cut or definite answer regarding the impact of microfinance
schemes. Conclusions might differ because of different methodologies used, because of diverse subjective interpretations given to
the same research findings, or because of the particular features of
the program one is studying. While studies that focus on the net,
and particularly the gross, impact of microfinance programs are
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many, there are few studies that compare the impact of slightly
diverging credit schemes. These kinds of exercises could, however,
provide us with highly relevant information for policy making.
They might indicate what particular features of programs are successful, and which modalities should be replicated, and which are
redundant or even counterproductive.
If the aim of policy is to promote children’s education, then it
might be interesting to explore whether it matters for children’s
schooling if credit is given in the hands of the mother or the father.
Other features of interest could be the particular delivery channel
that is used, the quantity of credit, or the type of credit provided.
Does consumptive credit produce the same effects as credit whose
use is restricted to productive activities? Are schemes that extend
higher amounts of credit more effective than those whose credit
ceilings are lower? Does channelling of credit through a financial
and social intermediary impinge differently on children’s schooling
than direct bank-borrower lending? In particular, because girls’
education is high on the agenda, policy relevance may further be
sharpened by differentiating between effects on boys and girls.
In the present study, we attempt to test the importance of the
borrower’s gender and the delivery channel for boys’ and girls’ education. More specifically, firstly, we have compared the impact of
direct bank-borrower credit in the hands of mothers and fathers on
selected indicators of children’s educational status. Secondly, we
have tested whether channelling individual credit to mothers
through women’s groups created differential effects as compared to
the case where no intermediary was used at all. In doing this, we
have used data from our 1998 survey of 300 rural South-Indian
households living below the poverty line who received credit in
slightly different ways. 1 As the validity of impact assessment results
are highly influenced by the underlying research methodology, we
have devoted considerable attention to research design. We have
mainly used quantitative methodologies for the data collection and
analysis, while data gathered through qualitative techniques has
provided us with interesting insights on possible explanatory factors. Before elaborating on this, we set out a framework that might
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help us to explore better the relationship between microfinance
and children’s education.

Microfinance and Intrahousehold Allocation
There is a growing body of literature focusing on the determinants
of children’s education and that of girls in particular (see, for
instance, King & Hill, 1993; World Bank, 2001). While influences
seem to be many and their interplay complex, it is commonly
understood that the level of investment in children’s education is
the result of a number of supply factors and an individual household’s demand for education. While a nation’s human capital efficiency may influence the level and quality of the supply, decisions
regarding children’s schooling result predominantly from an
implicit cost-benefit analysis made within the household. Costs
include direct financial costs, indirect or opportunity costs which
result from income foregone, and possibly also nonpecuniary costs
that individual parents have to put up with when their choices
deviate from the norms regarding children’s, and in particular
girls’, schooling. Benefits include returns to the family arising from
higher earnings to children that may be partly returned to parents
(King & Hill, 1993, pp. 21–34). Which costs and benefits are
entered in the calculus, as well as their relative importance, largely
depends on the perception of household decision makers. It is further not necessarily so that individual parents exhibit identical
preferences, and they may perceive costs and benefits differently.
There is for instance evidence from diverse cultural settings about
mothers preferring to allocate a higher percentage of the household
budget to children’s human capital goods as compared to fathers
(Kennedy & Peters, 1992; Mencher, 1988; Phipps & Burton,
1998; Thomas, 1997). These findings are particularly interesting
from a policy point of view. If the preferences of one of the parents
are closer to those of policy makers, it may be worthwhile investigating routes to increase this person’s leverage in the decisionmaking process.
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The possible impact of microfinance on children’s education
might be better explored when put against this framework of intrahousehold allocation. Microfinance schemes do not target children
directly, but the influence of the scheme goes through the nonneutral
intermediary of the household. Credit enters the household and
might influence several of the factors that determine children’s
education, including the overall financial budget as well as the
individual parent’s budget, the time allocation, the individual parent’s degree of participation in household decision making, and the
perceptions regarding the importance of children’s education.
Besides, it is highly hypothetical that diverging schemes will affect
the same factors in the same way. Productive and consumptive
credit will probably impinge differently on time allocation and
income generation, while credit targeted to one particular parent
might in particular influence that parent’s financial and time
budget and his/her leverage in decision making.
Notwithstanding the policy relevance of exploring the importance of particular features of microfinance programs, comparative
empirical studies remain scarce. For instance, impact assessment of
gender-specific credit is exceptional. One of the few exceptions is
the study of Pitt and Khandker (1998) that explicitly tests whether
Grameen Bank and similar group-based lending credit programs
have effects on allocative outcomes that are related to the gender of
the borrower. They found that credit allocated to mothers had a
higher impact on boys’ and girls’ (ages 5–17) schooling than credit
to fathers, but differences failed to be statistically significant.
While there is a vast literature documenting the importance of
a group’s financial and social intermediation for the lowering of
transaction costs and the increase in repayment rates (see, for
instance, Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990; Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Huppi &
Feder, 1990; Sharma & Zeller, 1997), there is no study that has
explicitly compared the impact of direct bank-borrower and groupmediated credit on intrahousehold allocative behavior. It is, however, unlikely that group membership would leave intrahousehold
behavior unchanged. Originally organized around the fulfilment of
a practical gender need, such as the easing of a credit constraint,
Volume 6 Number 2

31

Journal of Microfinance

groups often engage in collective action and extra-household bargaining with the community, strengthening in this way a member’s
position within the household (Agarwal, 1994, pp. 421–504;
Kabeer, 1995, pp. 223–263).
The present study also disaggregates data for boys and girls. This
enables us to test whether a borrower’s gender has differential effects on
boys and girls and similarly whether group membership has any such
effects. In her study about the empowerment potential of the Small
Enterpise Development Project in Bangladesh, Kabeer (2001, pp.
77–78) found that among male loanee households, the gross enrollment
rates were on average higher for boys than for girls, while the opposite
pattern occurred among female loanee households. Although these findings are at first sight surprising, they endorse previous research conclusions that have indicated that the preferences of mothers and fathers as
regards investment in boys and girls may differ. Thomas (1997) for
instance found evidence for Brazil on the phenomenon of gendered preferences, with mothers preferring to invest more in their daughters’ health
and education, while fathers preferred to devote more resources to
improve their sons’ nutritional status and schooling.
While our research agenda is straightforward, the validity of
our conclusions will to a large extent depend on the methodologies
used for measuring impact. As the threat of selection bias is particularly plausible in credit impact assessment, we have drawn
special attention to this issue. The next section sets out in more
detail the survey design and the data source used.

Survey Design and Data Source
Most impact studies of credit programs highlight “selection bias” as
one of the most serious threats to internal validity. Selection bias
may occur because of nonrandom program placement, through
selection by program staff, or because of self-selection by program
participants. It puts into perspective the impact of credit programs,
because one does not know whether effects may be attributed to
program participation or whether initially existing differences
among different groups, which eventually led to program participation, are responsible for the observed negative or positive effects.
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In the underlying research, the issue at stake is whether households
that received credit in different ways had initially significantly different scores on relevant background characteristics, which might
explain why they became beneficiaries of particular programs in
the first place and which might eventually also explain differences
in later scores on children’s education. Did credit programs applying different delivery models for instance operate in different kinds
of villages (the direct bank-borrower schemes in larger villages
where banks—and schools—are available)? Did credit programs
directed at women (un)deliberately target those women with a
higher schooling status who already had a higher stake in household decision making?
The only way in which to rule out completely the possibility
of selection bias is through an experimental design with random
assignment of individuals over the different credit programs. As it
was impossible to find highly similar credit schemes with the necessary differences in the borrower’s gender and delivery channel
that were in a takeoff stage, it was impossible to proceed this way.
We instead opted for a quasiexperimental design using matching
on some important characteristics during the design phase of the
research while controlling statistically for remaining differences at
the moment of analysis. 2 Matching between different credit programs at the design phase was done through the selection of credit
programs that were highly similar in outlook (except for the
needed variation in the gender of the beneficiary and the delivery
model), that targeted households with similar socio-economic
characteristics (below poverty line, less than two acres of landholdings), and that were randomly implemented over villages in
the same area. Once we had identified in this way the research population, we randomly selected from each group a sample of 50
households. We subsequently made a more detailed profile of
different subsamples of households and we tested formally how
successful our matching during the design phase had been.
Remaining statistically significant differences were controlled for
during the regression analysis. In what follows, we subsequently
describe the selection of credit programs, the research area, the
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study population, the sample, and the dependent variables. Table 1
at the end of this section summarizes relevant background characteristics of different subsamples and gives an overview of test
results.

Selection of Credit Programs
Microfinance programs were selected on the basis of a review of
schemes that were operational in southern India. We thereby
focused on a number of criteria, such as characteristics of the target
group, eligibility and financial criteria, delivery model, placement
strategy, and member selection processes. We finally selected the
Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and the Tamil
Nadu Women’s Development Programme (TNWDP), programs
that are highly similar in outlook except for the needed difference
in the borrower’s gender and in the delivery model. The Integrated
Rural Development Programme (IRDP) is a country-level poverty
alleviation program launched throughout India in 1978. It directly
targets credit and earmarks loans for productive purposes only.
Clients are both men and women below the poverty line3 and with
maximum landholdings of two acres. Although IRDP guidelines
emphasize the importance of the follow-up of beneficiaries, the
assistance provided has proved to be largely inadequate (Gaiha,
Imai, & Kaushik, 2001, pp. 314; IFAD, 1989, pp. 9; World Bank,
1991, pp. 162–168). As a consequence, IRDP in practice provides
a one-shot credit intervention, a fact that has contributed to its
failure. Different studies have highlighted the considerable misuse
of IRDP loans (on average, 20% to 40%), the extremely low repayment (on average, 24% to 40%), as well as the low percentage of
beneficiaries (on average, 28% to 35%) who manage to improve
their financial situation and to cross the poverty line (Ghosh,
1998; IFAD, 1989, pp. 9).
The IFAD-funded Tamil Nadu Women’s Development
Programme (TNWDP) has been conceptualized to remedy IRDP
deficiencies in the selection, monitoring, and enforcement
process. 4 It is operational in the southern state of Tamil Nadu since
1990 and started off in those districts where the score on social
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indicators of female status was lowest (i.e., first in Dharmapuri and
later on in South Arcot, Salem, Ramanathapuram, and Madurai).
Within districts, program placement is at random and no evidence
could be found that the program has, for instance, only started off
in more accessible and larger villages, leaving aside more remote
villages. The program targets households with a similar socioeconomic profile as the IRDP and uses similar financial conditions
regarding interest rates, subsidies, loan repayment period, and loan
use requirements. The main innovative element of the TNWDP is
the use of women’s groups, often called self-help groups, for the
channelling of the individual IRDP loans and other services, such
as information-sharing; training in technical areas, management,
and leadership; and awareness-raising activities related to gender
and social development issues. Non-governmental organisations
are heavily involved in the TNWDP. They establish women’s
groups and link them to rural bank branches after they have
functioned as savings and credit groups for a short period.
Members contribute compulsory savings to their individual savings
account and to the group fund that is used to provide small
consumption and emergency loans to its members. NGOs operational in the research area are the Mysore Resettlement
and Development Agency (Myrada) and the Rural Integrated
Development Organisation (Rido). The former has a more developed organizational and management structure and brings women
together every week, whereas Rido groups meet only every other
week. While both organizations provide social welfare services,
Myrada invests more in building up human resources of marginalized groups, transforming women’s groups into actors of local
institutional change. The TNWDP was first implemented in the
Dharmapuri District, where groups were formed from 1990 until
1994. We have selected this research area because it allowed testing
the importance of membership duration.
In summary, the following five credit program variables were used:
1. Direct credit to men extended through IRDP in 1993–1994
(IRDP Male)
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2. Direct credit to women extended through IRDP in 1993–
1994 (IRDP Female)
3. Credit extended in 1993–1994 to women member of
Myrada groups since 1993–1994 (TNWDP Myrada
Young)
4. Credit extended in 1990–1991 to women member of
Myrada groups since 1990–1991 (TNWDP Myrada Old)
5. Credit channelled in 1990–1991 to women member of Rido
groups since 1990–1991 (TNWDP Rido Old)
Comparing the impact of IRDP Male and IRDP Female (schemes
1 and 2) allows testing the importance of the borrower’s gender,
whereas a comparison of the impact of the IRDP Female and
TNWDP Myrada Young (schemes 2 and 3) highlights the importance of financial and social group intermediation. Aside from
these two issues, which are the scope of this article, comparing the
effect of Myrada Young and Myrada Old schemes provides insights
into the impact of longer group membership, while the effect of
organizing an NGO may be tested through a comparison of impact
on Myrada and Rido beneficiaries. 5

Research Site
One particular area within the Dharmapuri District, Morappur
Block, was selected where IRDP and TNWDP loans are extended
through three bank branches of the Indian Bank that use the same
standard regulations and that are partly staffed by the same persons. The research area is an exclusive agricultural area where the
1991 Household Survey identified about 42% of the overall population living below the poverty line. Morappur Block is part of the
Baramahal area, where Tamil is the dominant language. While
South India is characterized by the Dravidian culture, which in
general poses less severe limitations on girls’ and women’s behavior
than the Aryan culture of the North, any such appreciation should
be set against the general background of female discrimination.
Even within Tamil Nadu, sex ratios are below 1000 and results of
subsequent household surveys suggest a worsening over time.
Although in 1961 there were 992 women for every 1000 men, the
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ratio declined to 977 in 1981 and 972 in 1991 (Subrahmanyam &
Rao, 1995).

Study Population and Sample
In an effort to avoid the confounding (spillover) effects of credit
schemes, households were excluded that received credit through
both IRDP and TNWDP. While there is mutual exclusivity
between the different credit programs, diffusion effects may take
place in more subtle ways. Merely living in a village where women’s
groups are operational, without being a member oneself, could be
enough to undergo part of its effects (see, for instance, Hashemi &
Schuler, 1994). The study population of IRDP beneficiaries was
thus restricted to villages where women’s groups were not present
but that were highly similar in outlook. In addition, the survey
included a section on the degree of interface between nonTNWDP beneficiaries and women’s groups.
In 1990–1991, about 497 women living in the Morappur
Block received loans under the TNWDP. Of the 497, about 397
belonged to Myrada groups and 100 to Rido groups. In the period
1993–1994, about 200 women received loans through Myrada
groups (MAHAM, 1996). Bank staff estimated that in the same
period about 420 men and 180 women benefited from IRDP
loans, of which 250 men and 100 women lived in non-TNWDP
villages. Out of each group we have drawn a random sample of 50
households. Aside from the differential impact of different credit
schemes, we were also interested in their net impact. We consequently also included a comparison group of 50 below-poverty-line
households living in Morappur Block who were eligible candidates
for IRDP credit and TNWDP membership but who had so far not
received any credit. Data on school enrollment was only collected
for children in the age group four to seventeen years (a sample
of 759 children), whereas data on the kind of schooling was
collected for those children who were ever enrolled in schools (a
sample of 635 children).
Once the six subsamples of 50 households were selected, we
made a detailed profile of each subsample on the basis of in-depth
interviewing using retrospective questions on relevant household
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and individual-level characteristics. A comparison of the profile of
the different subsamples shows that the beneficiaries did not have
a significantly different profile at the moment of credit receipt.
The large majority of all households belonged to the mostbackward castes, were landless, or owned only a small piece of
land. The majority of the women were illiterate, whereas on
average about 50% of the husbands could read and write. In-depth
interviewing further revealed that the majority of the TNWDP
beneficiaries did not decide themselves to become a member of a
women’s group. Most of them had actually been “forced” by their
husbands who had been attracted themselves by the selective
incentive of future credit receipt.
As this study focuses on the differential impact of firstly IRDP
Male versus IRDP Female and secondly TNWDP Myrada Young
versus IRDP Female (and IRDP Male), we have restricted the
comparative analysis to those groups. Statistically significant differences resulting from t-tests are presented at the bottom of Table
1. Differences between the subsamples are at the level of the household landownership, the literacy status of the female respondents,
and the literacy status of their husbands. More specifically, children in IRDP Male households had a higher chance of having
literate parents (as compared to children in IRDP Female and
TNWDP Young), while female members of a women’s group
tended to belong more to landed households (as compared to
IRDP Female and Male households). If anything, our data does
not support the idea that women’s groups recruited women who
had a higher literacy status: of the 50 Myrada Young beneficiaries,
only six were literate at the outset (against 15 wives of IRDP Male
beneficiaries). They do seem to have recruited among the slightly
better off: landownership among TNWDP households was higher
than it was among IRDP beneficiaries. Statistical analysis and
qualitative information from interviews, however, suggest that
landownership has no unequivocally beneficial effect on children’s
schooling. Children are engaged at younger ages in all kinds of
agricultural labor tasks, in particular where supervision of hired
laborers is difficult or expensive, and moral hazard problems
occur. 6 Our own data suggest that a household’s landownership
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Table 1. Sampling information and scores on selected
background characteristics
IRDP IRDP TNWDP TNWDP TNWDP Control
Male Female Myrada Myrada Rido Old Group
Young
Old
Sampling Details
Number of households
Number of children
(4–17 years)
girls
boys
Number of children ever
enrolled in schools
girls
boys

50

50

50

50

50

50

50
58

56
66

67
69

72
81

63
73

49
55

30
54

38
60

56
62

61
77

51
67

32
47

16
(5.2)

15
(4.9)

18
(5.4)

17
(5.1)

12
(4.7)

82
18

94
6

86
14

84
16

84
16

46
54

66
34

58
42

62
38

46
54

1.91
(2.1)

1.98
(1)

1.75
(1.2)

1.83
(1.12)

1.97
(1.5)

12
88

12
88

20
80

30
70

28
72

56
44

46
54

54
46

50
50

54
46

Background characteristics
Mean age of children
14
(5.4)
Caste
% most backward
92
% scheduled
8
Landownership a
% yes
56
% no
44
Mean quantity of land
owned (in acres)
2.12
(1.6)
Literacy status of
female respondent b
% yes
30
% no
70
Literacy status of
husband c
% yes
66
% no
34

Note. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
a Difference between TNWDP Myrada Young and IRDP Female is statistically
significant at 5% level (t-value: 2.157).
b Difference between IRDP Female and IRDP Male is statistically significant at 1%
level (t-value: 3.028); difference between TNWDP Myrada Young and IRDP Male is
statistically significant at 1% level (t-value: 3.026).
c Difference between TNWDP Myrada Young and IRDP Male is statistically
significant at 5% level (t-value: 2.040).
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lowers school enrollment but increases the probability that when
children are sent to school it will be to a more expensive and qualitatively better private school instead of to a public one. The
abovementioned statistically significant differences among
subsamples were controlled for when analyzing impacts of different
credit schemes on children’s education through regression analysis.

Dependent Variables
The choice for particular indicators has been guided by existing
secondary literature (see, for instance, Drèze & Sen, 1995,
pp. 109–139; King & Hill, 1993, pp. 1–50) and by the financial
and time constraints of the study. Aside from a categorical variable,
“incidence of schooling,” we have included a numerical variable
“number of years of schooling” to capture the effect of differential
dropout rates of boys and girls (King & Hill, 1993, pp. 6–9). We
have further differentiated between private and public schooling,
the former being considered of higher quality by parents. Sending
children to a private school entails a number of direct costs, such
as tuition and travelling expenditures, that can be avoided if children go to public schools that are more widely available and free of
direct costs. Attention for the output of schooling was captured
through the inclusion of the “incidence of literacy” measured by
“the ability to read and write.”
Data collection was restricted to children in the age-group four
to seventeen years. Data was primarily gathered through selfreporting by the mother, complemented by on-the-spot visits in
schools and cross-checking of self-reported information with
schooling records.

Regression Analysis and Findings
Assessing the impact of different credit programs on the different
input and output indicators of children’s educational status (ages
4–17) was done through the use of logistic regression models in the
case of the categorical dependent variables (“incidence of schooling,” “kind of schooling,” and “incidence of literacy”) and through
ordinary least squares regression in the case of the numerical
dependent variable “number of years of schooling.” As the main
40
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interest of our research is testing the differential impact of different credit programs (and not so much the net impact of a program
versus a nontreatment group) on children’s educational status, we
have calculated statistics that summarize the effect of one credit
program versus another. In the case of logistic regression models,
we calculated odds ratios, while differences in coefficients were
calculated in the case of the numerical dependent variable.

Gender and Birth Order Effect in Educational
Inputs and Outputs
Although it was not the primary focus of this research, the data
collected supports earlier findings on the existence of a widespread
pro-male bias in children’s educational status (see, for example,
World Bank, 2001, pp. 31–72). Regression results furnish evidence
that there exists in our sample a severe pro-male bias in children’s
educational investments and literacy outcomes. It proves to be
about 3.9 times more likely that boys rather than girls are enrolled
in schools. On average, girls receive two years less of schooling
than boys, while, in general, no evidence was found that girls, if
being sent to school, had less chance of being in a private rather
than a public school. The sex-differential pattern of investment in
girls’ schooling results in a female literacy rate that is only onethird of that of boys.
In addition to a gender effect, a birth order effect seems to play
a role. Our data suggest that being born earlier (higher birth order)
significantly reduces the average number of years of schooling.
Interestingly, the birth order and gender effects seem to reinforce
each other: being the eldest daughter makes it the least likely to be
enrolled in school. Compared to the eldest son, the eldest daughter is about 12 times less likely to be enrolled in school. A second
born daughter is about 1.7 times more likely to be enrolled
compared to her elder sister. Observations during field research
indicated that elder daughters are strongly engaged in all kinds of
household activities, such as cleaning, sweeping, water, fuel collection, and childcare.
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Table 2. Contrasts in effects of different credit programs

Dependent Variables
Incidence of Schooling
(yes=1)
All children
Boys
Girls
Kind of Schooling
(private=1)
All children
Boys
Girls
Incidence of Literacy
(yes=1)
All children
Boys
Girls
Number of Years of
Schooling
All children
Boys
Girls

Null-hypothesis:
IRDP Female =
IRDP Male

Null-hypothesis:
TNWDP Myrada
Young = IRDP Female

Null-hypothesis:
TNWDP Myrada
Young = IRDP Male

Failure to reject

Failure
to reject

Failure
to reject

1.401
0.975
1.35

2.194
1.059

0.827
0.770
0.993

3.036

1.307
1.228
1.265

1.124

+0.612
+0.106
+0.836

+0.083

Rejection

Rejection

2.686**
1.033
3.842**

5.191***

3.923***

3.245**
2.337

5.938**

5.894*

2.656***

3.473***
1.381

7.121***

9.007***

+1.054*

+1.666***
+0.189

+2.445***

+3.281***

Note. For categorical variables (“incidence of schooling,” “kind of schooling,” “incidence of
literacy”), odds ratios are given. For numerical variables (“number of years of schooling”),
differences in coefficients are given. T-tests are used to check whether differences in effects of
credit programs are statistically significant at 10% (*), at 5% (**), or at 1% (***).

Does Direct Credit to the Mother and the Father Affect
Children’s Schooling Differently?
Results of regression analysis summarized in Table 2 indicate that
it does not matter for children’s education whether credit enters
the household through the mother or the father. For almost all
educational inputs and outputs, slightly higher scores are recorded
when the mother receives the credit (odds ratios IRDP
Female/IRDP Male >1 for the categorical dependent variables,
positive differences for the numerical dependent variables) but the
differences are minor and fail to be significant. Going back to the
original estimates of the IRDP Male and IRDP Female impact even
suggests that there are no statistically significant effects at all of
direct credit on children’s schooling or literacy. Whether the loan
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was used productively and generated additional revenues, or
whether it was considered a gift from the government that was used
for consumptive purposes (in about 42% of the cases for IRDP
Male and 60% of the cases for IRDP Female), additional resources
have not led to an increase in children’s schooling or literacy.

The Importance of the Mother’s Group Membership
Not only does using women’s groups as intermediaries seem beneficial from the point of view of the credit supplier, there are also
strong indications that it significantly increases the probability
that children are kept in school longer, are sent to private schools,
and become literate. Table 2 (third and fourth columns) shows that
compared to children whose father or mother received credit
directly, children living in households where credit entered
through women’s groups, remain on average about one to one-anda-half years longer in school. It is about 3.2 to 3.9 times more
probable that they will be enrolled in private rather than in public
schools, and about 2.7 to 3.5 times more probable that they will be
able to read and write.
Do Effects Play Out Differently for Girls and Boys?
Results of regression analysis summarized in Table 2 (third and
fourth columns) show that only girls reap the benefits of their
mother’s group membership. Contrasts of net effects show that, for
boys, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that there are no additional effects of mother’s group membership. This strongly
contrasts with our findings for girls, where we reject the nullhypotheses for all variables. Compared to their counterparts in
IRDP Female and Male households (third and fourth columns), it
is about 3.8 to 5 times more probable that girls are sent to school
rather than being kept at home, about 5.9 times more probable
that they are in private rather than in public schools, and about 7
to 9 times more likely that they will become literate. They benefit
from 2.4 to 3.3 additional years of schooling. In a context of a
severe male bias, this induces a weakening of the existing gap in
educational inputs and outputs, but fails to wash it out.
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Exploring Possible Explanatory Factors
While these research findings are not unique and are supported by
Kabeer (2001, pp. 77–78), among others, they are at least surprising. Conventional theory of income and substitution effects clearly
fails to explain the sharply contrasting results of slightly diverging
credit programs. On the contrary, as there is a close substitutability between mother’s and daughter’s labor, we would normally
expect that the positive income effect of mother’s borrowing and
resulting employment would partially be outweighed by a negative
substitution effect in the case of girls. It seems that in the case of
the mother’s group membership, other effects are at work than the
pure income and substitution effects. Information from individual
interviews combined with data from group interviews taken from
selected women’s groups suggest that at least part of the explanation may be sought in the influence of group membership on
decision-making processes in the household.
During interviews, mothers often stressed the importance of
their daughters’ education. They explicitly pointed out that they
always had thought that female education was crucial but that it
was only because of their participation in women’s groups that they
were able to increase their say in household decision making and
get their ideas implemented. According to them, women’s groups
were especially important in liberating access and control over
resources from men’s mediation. Consider the following statements
made by individual members:
While the access to credit was important at the outset, it is the
access and control over other resources that has become much
more important. Because of my membership, I was able to put
some of my own personal income on a personal savings
account. Because all administrative formalities that are linked
with this account are performed within the group, my husband
has no access to this account.
The respect I get from my mother-in-law has increased because
I’m the one who has access to money [from the group common
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fund] when there are urgent household expenditures to be
made.
Aside from the access to material resources, they also gained access
and control over intangible, nonmaterial resources. Particularly
important for most of them was the fact that group membership
had expanded the “female space” by opening access to more
heterogeneous spheres of public life, such as the village council,
the teacher-parents association, the dairy cooperative society,
or the forest committee. This participation in extrahousehold
decision-making bodies clearly has an effect on intrahousehold decision-making processes. Consider the following statement:
Because of the linkage project I have become a member of the
teacher-parents association in my son’s school. Before, my husband
would not have allowed and I would not have been bold
enough to participate. Now, he is even proud that I go to talk
with the others [women of higher castes]. He even believes that
I know more now and he listens more to me.
This evidence does not stand alone. It is supported by evidence
from earlier studies (see, for instance, Agarwal, 1994, pp.
421–504; Kabeer, 1995, pp. 223–263), which have shown that
group membership and collective action may act as powerful leverages to change underlying allocative rules, which might eventually
contribute to alterations in observed intrahousehold outcomes if
parents exhibit different preferences.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
Comparing the effects of slightly diverging credit programs that
are operational in South India leads to the conclusion that in the
case of direct bank-borrower credit it does not matter for children’s
education whether credit is in the hands of mothers or fathers.
Results from regression analysis even suggest that direct individual
bank-borrower lending does not induce any effects at all on children’s educational inputs and outputs. This conclusion is strongly
put into perspective when we focus on the impact of groupVolume 6 Number 2
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mediated credit. Data from our household survey indicates that
women’s group membership strongly affects girls’ schooling and
literacy while it leaves that of boys largely unchanged. In a context
of a severe pro-male bias, women’s group membership helps to
reduce the existing gap in children’s schooling and literacy, even if
it fails to close it completely.
Individual interviewing with borrowers and interviews with
focus groups suggest that the impact of women’s group membership could be mediated through changes provoked in underlying
decision-making processes. Women’s group membership deliberates access and control over material and nonmaterial resources
from men’s mediation, which seems to increase their leverage
within household decision making. Women’s increased participation in household decision making has enabled them to see their
preferences for their daughters’ schooling more reflected in the
final decisions regarding the allocation of educational inputs.
In a context of a growing consensus on the importance of girls’
education for overall allocative efficiency, as well as for human
development, these findings have important policy implications.
For girls’ education, it clearly matters who decides and who controls resources in the household. One of the most direct routes
towards increasing girls’ education seems to increase their mothers’
intrahousehold decision making. Our research shows that
channelling credit through well functioning women’s groups could
trigger this effect.

Notes
Thank you to Prof. Dr. R. Renard and anonymous referees of the journal for
the valuable comments and suggestions. All errors remaining are the sole responsibility of the author.
1. See Holvoet (1999) for more details about this survey.
2. Sophisticated impact assessment studies often use two-stage estimation models
(such as Heckman's econometric approach) to arrive at unbiased estimates of impact.
Crucial (and a major problem) in these models is the selection of an instrumental
variable that summarizes well the “selection effect.” In my research, it was impossible
to identify reasonable candidates, which prevented the use of a two-stage estimation
model.
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3. In 1989, households below poverty line were identified as those whose annual
household income was below Rs. 6400; from 1996 on the cut-off point was Rs. 11000.
4. While transaction costs have declined under the TNWDP both for borrowers
and banks, repayment problems remain. Bennett, Goldberg, et al. (1996) blame the
lack of group ownership of the financial service system, which partly comes from the
essential nature of donor funding in the generation of loan capital. The disproportionate role of an NGO in the financial intermediation process, leaving little responsibility for the groups, further exacerbates this problem, negatively affecting
repayment performance. Recently, however, the TNWDP has begun to shift more
responsibility for financial intermediation to the groups, limiting NGOs to the role
of social intermediary.
5. For an overview of these results, see Holvoet (1999).
6. Children of small farmers were, for instance, often engaged in animal herding.
De Janvry et al. (1992, p. 433–434) report similar findings for Morocco and blame
the imperfect substitution of the families’ own children's labor for hired labor in
animal herding.
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